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saepe evenisse and quas scio multas plurimum valuisse . S. B . prefers the latter
view if the text is sound' . I do not believe it is, and would read <et> quidem ;
the corruption of quidem to quod, easy in any context, is particularly so here
because of the following quod.
15, 4, 6. cumque magnum bellum in Cappadocia concitaretur si sacerdos
armis se, quod facturus putabatur, defenderet, adulescens et equitatu e t
peditatu et petunia paratus et ttotot its qui novari aliquid volebant, perfeci u t
e regno ille discederet .
toto MV : tuto DHF
For the corrupt word a list of about 25 suggestions can be compiled fro m
the editions, but none of them is even plausible . Preferable to any of them
would, I believe, be fautor; forfautor construed with a dative see LANDGRAF




PLINY AND THE PATRONAGE OF COMMUNITIES *
Walter Schmitthenner zum 60. Geburtstag
Few historians would disagree with the statement that patronage is one o f
the most important, and yet elusive bonds in Roman society . To begin with, it
is not easy to define what patronage is . To what extent, for example, do the
words patrocinium, patronatus, fides and clientela describe different aspects
of the same phenomenon t ? Moreover, there is the difficult question o f
* The vocabulary of patronage is always difficult . I have used the Latin words patronatus,
patron us and patrocinium in reference to the relationship arising out of a formal cooptation . The
English words »patronu and »patronageo are, in contrast, used non-technically to describe an y
relationship based on mutual obligation andfides in which beneficia and officia are performed b y
parties of different status . Frequently cited literature : BADIAN = E . BADIAN, Foreign Clientelae ,
Oxford 1958 . - GELZER = M . GELZER . Die Nobilitat der rOmischen Republik (1912), in : Klein e
Schriften, Wiesbaden 1962, I . - HARMAND = L . HARMAND, Le patronat sur les collectivites
publiques, Paris 1957 .
For their comments on the improvement of the text, I would like to thank A . ECKSTEIN, C . P .
JONES, B . M . LEvICK, J . BLEICICEN and an anonymous critic .
For a discussion of the latter two and of entry into the relationship, see BADIAN, 1 ff. No
article on patrocinium has appeared in RE . Though various studies of patronage in the lat e
republic and Augustan eras exist (cf. A. VON PREMERSTEIN, Art . Clientes RE IV, 23ff ; Vom
Werden and Wesen des Prinzipats, Abh . Munchen 1937, Heft 15, 113ff .), there has been no




whether the English word >>patronage<< is an adequate label for the institu -
tions described by these words . And finally, it should be noted that patronag e
has for us a slightly negative or at best, a neutral force, which was not the cas e
for the Roman .
Patronage is usually divided into four categories 2 . There is the relationship
between the patron and his libertus, between the patron and free-born indi-
viduals of lower social standing, the patronage acquired by the advocat e
(patronus causae), and the patronage of communities . It is the last of thes e
which is the subject of this paper . These categories are, however, not rigid ;
one of the basic responsibilities of the patron of a community, for example, i s
to render legal assistance to his client, namely to the community and it s
members .
It is generally agreed that the origin of patronage as an institution is to b e
found in Rome's pre-history 3 . During the republic, patronage, with it s
emphasis on protection and on the basic inequality of the two contracting
parties, complemented the related concept of hospitium, which stressed
reciprocity and the equality of both sides 4 . BADIAN has argued, however, that
in the 2nd Century B .C., as the dominance of Rome and of individual Roma n
became increasingly manifest, the theoretical reciprocity and equality of th e
latter disappeared and the two concepts, patrocinium and hospitium, merged .
For all essential purposes, he concludes, the Roman noble treated hospites
and clientes in the same way 5 .
MOMMSEN labeled the relationships of patrocinium and hospitium >>Con-
sensualvertrage<< that is, oral agreements concluded with a >>beiderseitig e
Willenserklarung« 6 . More accurately, they may be considered simply as non-
actionable agreements . This extra-legal basis refers back, as does the emphasi s
on the pietas which was felt to exist in the relationships, to the pre-historica l
development of both . The moral force of the pietas in maintaining these con-
nections should not be underestimated, but there was another consideration ,
on a more pragmatic level, which also served to bind the two parties ; namely
the loss of prestige and fides incumbant with the abandonment of the other
party in a time of need' . Or, more positively, such relationships prospered be -
cause they brought credit to both parties . They were a visible manifestation o f
the power and influence of each .
2 These are the categories discussed by GELZER, 68ff .
3 This is demonstrated by the fact that the patronage relationship, except for that betwee n
patronus and libertus, remained outside the his civae . On the subject, see TH. MOMMSEN, Da s
romische Gastrecht and die romische Clientel, in : Romische Forschungen, Berlin 1864, 1, 386 ;
BADIAN, 1ff . and J . MARQUARDT, Das Privatleben der Romer, Leipzig 1886, 195 ff .
4 MOMMSEN, Gastrecht, 329ff.
5 BADIAN, 154- 155 .
6 MOMMSEN, Gastrecht, 335 .
7 Cf. FIRA2 I, page 62, nr . 21 ; Gell . (quoting Cato) V, 13, 4 and D . H. II, 10, 3 .
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That the patronage of communities was a successful institution was due i n
part to its flexibility in both form and content . The community could use the
honor or dignity both to reward its benefactors (ob merita, cf. ILS 6109, 6110)
and to encourage generosity ( . . . ut tantae virtutis vir auxilio sit futurus
municipio nostro, ILS 6106) . Moreover, what MOMMSEN considered a logica l
impossibility (in a literal sense) of being both patron us and hospes to the same
community and of being patronus and hospes to one's patria, the Romans
easily accepted 8 . Such combinations are not unknown in the late republi c
(e . g ., ILS 6049), but become increasingly common in the 2nd and 3r d
Centuries A .D . Finally, flexibility was also ensured by the fact that, thoug h
Roman law established conditions by which the honor might be bestowed, i t
did not specify who might become patronus or define the duties of eithe r
party9 . Indeed, the tabulae patronatus 10 , which commemorate the establish-
ment of the agreement between patron and client-community, should be un-
derstood as honorary decrees rather than as legal contracts .
The patronage of communities, understood in its broadest sense, mani-
fests itself in both a formal and in an informal manner . The leges Ursonensis
and Malacitana describe the formalities that must be gone through before th e
title could be officially conferred by a decretum of the municipal senate" .
There can be no doubt that the approximately one thousand municipal pa-
troni known from inscriptions were formally designated in accordance wit h
these regulations . Indeed, the abovementioned tabulae patronatus are the
physical manifestation of these provisions .
Informally, the situation was somewhat different . There was another
group of benefactors who, although they did not formally have the honor o r
status of patron, nevertheless conferred beneficia on various communities an d
generally acted as »patrons« . For obvious reasons, it is not easy to identif y
these individuals, but at least two categories may be noted . There was, first, a
group of would-be patroni whose merita and connections with the town were
not yet considered sufficient for the honor . A second group would be made u p
of those whose beneficia were ample, but for whom, for one reason or an -
other, the official honor was not considered appropriate . The letters of Pliny
the Younger are particularly useful for understanding how patronage of com -
munities worked in both the formal and, what is more important, in the infor -
mal relationship .
The particular questions to be discussed here are : first, what were the con-
ditions and circumstances surrounding the initiation of these relationships ?
MOMMSEN, Gastrecht, 331, 334 and 358ff .
9 On this question, see J . NicoLs, Zur rechtlichen Lage des Gemeindepatronats, Chiro n
(forthcoming) .
10 R . CAGNAT, Cours d'Epigraphie latine, Paris 19144 , 330 and HARMAND, 332ff .




Secondly, what is the relationship between formal patronatus and benefac-
tion? And, thirdly, what attitudes governed the exercise of these related insti -
tutions? Chronologically, the period under consideration is the early princi-
pate, particularly the reign of Trajan .
Pliny included a number of letters about his activities as a patron of com-
munities ; in fact, they make up a good proportion of the large number of let-
ters concerning the various forms of patronage. His relations to three towns in
Italy (Tifernum Tiberinum in Etruria, Firmum in Picenum and his patria of
Comum) and to the Baetici illustrate well the variable nature of the patrona l
relationship .
Concerning his relationship to Tifernum, Pliny, in writing to his wife' s
grandfather about a prospective visit, comments :
erit una sed brevis mora : deflectemus in Tuscos, non ut agros remqu e
familiarem oculis subiciamus (id enim postponi palest), sed ut funga-
mur necessario officio . oppidum est praediis nostris vicinum (nomen Ti-
ferni Tiberini), quad me paene adhuc puerum patronum cooptavit ,
tanto maiore studio quanto minore iudicio (IV, 1, 3 - 4) .
There can be no question here about Pliny's status : me . . . patronum coopta-
vit is the precise legal language for the cooptation of patroni known from mu -
nicipal charters and from the various tabulae patronatus !2 .
We do not know how many other patroni Tifernum might have had 13 , but
Pliny's age at the time of the cooptation was remarkable (even to himself! )
and requires some explanation . SHERWIN-WHITE has suggested that he was ,
in fact, 17 or 18 years old at the time in question and that the occasion was hi s
acceptance of the inheritance of his uncle, Pliny the Elder, who had died dur -
ing the Vesuvius eruption of 79 14. In that year Pliny was 17 . Though the evi-
dence for the connection is not decisive, it is difficult to establish any othe r
source for this valuable piece of property l s .
The situation may be reconstructed as follows . The elder Pliny owned a
large estate near Tifernum L6 . On his death, the estate passed to his nephew ,
and now adopted son, Pliny the Younger . As the estate was one of the larges t
in the area and as Pliny, in combining the property of both his natural an d
adoptive parents, had become a very wealthy man 17 , it would have been desir-
12 ILS 6089 c . 61 and ILS 6093ff . They are discussed by HARMAND, 332ff.
13 There were no restrictions on the number or age of patroni Cf. A . N . SHERWIN-WHITE, The
Letters of Pliny the Younger : A Historical and Social Commentary, Oxford 1966, 265 .
14 Ibid .
13 This connection has been generally accepted, cf . R. qUNCAN-JONES, The Economy of the
Roman Empire, Cambridge 1974, 19 .
16 The income from this estate was HS 400000 per annum, ep . X, 8, 4.
17 On Pliny's wealth, see DUNCAN-JONES, Economy, 17 -32 .
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able for the community to insure his good-will by coopting him as patronus
immediately upon acceptance of the inheritance . The urgency would be espe-
cially pressing as Pliny had no other bond to the community .
Two points are remarkable in this action . The first concerns the status o f
Pliny the Elder in Tifernum and the second the official justification for co -
opting his adoptive son . Concerning the first, it is manifest in the tabulae pa-
tronatus that the patronus and all his descendants received the clientela 18 .
There is no evidence proving that Pliny the Elder was a patron of this town ,
but if he were, then the formal cooptation of his adopted son would hav e
been, though technically not necessary, all that more impressive for having
taken place at all . More interesting is the question of how the citizens of Tifer -
num justified coopting the young Pliny . The two surviving tabulae emanating
from Italian communities are in the form of decreta decurionum and justify
the cooptation by describing at length, though in vague terms, the merits o f
the patron 19 . This would have been difficult to do in the case of the young Pli -
ny. But, regardless of the status of the elder Pliny or of the public justification
for the cooptation of his nephew, it is clear that the citizens of Tifernum were
anxious to secure the good-will of the new landowner . Hence, Pliny's wealth ,
and not his merits or still unproven talents, was the motivating factor in th e
decision to coopt him .
The importance of this letter then is that it clearly reveals the means which
communities used in order to secure the good-will of those who possesse d
wealth and influence . Inscriptions protest (perhaps too much) that the hono r
had been won by merit 20 , but it was probably an all too frequent occurrenc e
that communities bestowed the honor as an incentive in the hope that it woul d
eventually be deserved 21 .
This letter is also of interest because it indicates the nature of the mutua l
responsibilities of both parties . Pliny comments further :
adventus meos celebrat, profectionibus angitur, honoribus gaudet . in
hoc ego, ut referrem gratiam (nam vinci in am ore turpissimum est) ,
templum petunia mea exstruxi (IV, 1, 4-5) .
The basis of the exchange is clear : in return for the acknowledgment o f
Pliny's superior status, he is prepared to assume financial responsibility fo r
local projects, in this case for the building of a temple. That is, benefactions ,
here material ones, are being traded off against prestige .
18 The usual formula is : sibs liberis posterisque suis in fidem clientelamque suam recepit ,
ILS 6100 .
19 1LS 6106, 6110 .
20 Cf . HARMAND, 357 .
21 Augustus attempted to regulate this form of obribery<< by forbidding provincials to hono r




Though Pliny's attitude is clearly >>patronizing<<, he does, nevertheless ,
seem to have taken genuine pleasure from the enthusiasm of the citizens of Ti-
fernum. Even so, he is acutely aware of the reality : the costs he has assumed
are seen as a necessary burden (necessarium officium, IV, 1, 3) 22 . He has as-
sumed them not because of the prestige he might enjoy in a small town but be-
cause such officia belong to the responsibilities of the good citizen . Officially ,
Pliny built the temple because he wanted to thank the community for the ho-
nors he had received from it (cf . VI, 34) ; unofficially, he recognizes that th e
patron must also be a benefactor .
The situation described in III, 4, is more complex but well illustrates th e
characteristics of the institution in Pliny's day and the attitudes toward i t
among men of his standing. In this letter, Pliny describes how an embassy ha d
arrived from the province of Baetica with the intention of indicting its former
governor, Caecilius Classicus (PIR2 C 32). The provincial legates request th e
services of the advocate for the prosecution ; he, however, wishes to decline,
claiming other duties . Subsequently, he writes ,
Factum est senatus consultum perquam honorificum, ut darer provin-
cialibus patronus si ab ipso me impetrassent . Legati rursus inducti ite-
rum me lam praesentem advocatum postulaverunt, implorantes fide m
meam quam esset contra Massam Baebium experti, adlegantes patrocin i
foedus. Secuta est senatus clarissima adsensio, quae solet decreta prae-
currere . Turn ego Destino' inquam, 'patres conscripts, putare me iusta s
excusationis causas attulisse'. Placuit et modestia sermonis et ratio (III ,
4, 3 - 4) .
This letter is not easy to interpret, for Pliny uses the vocabulary of patronag e
in a manner which, though perhaps clear to his contemporaries, is ambiguous .
The result is that his relationship to the Baetici remains obscure . Nevertheless ,
this letter does illustrate, as no inscription can, the basic contradiction be-
tween the theory and practice of patronage during the principate .
In form, this letter is consistent with the principles outlined by J . B>JRAN-
GER in his discussion of le refus du pouvoir, namely, that one generates legiti-
mation, consensus and authority by initially refusing and then being > per-
suaded<< to accept a power or a responsibility which one has already deter -
mined to exercise 23 . BERANGER is referring, of course, to the role of the em-
peror and how each successive princeps legitimized his position by giving, a t
first, a show of refusing power . It is, however, interesting to observe how Pli-
ny uses the same devices of recusatio and cunctatio in order to secure prior ap -
proval for actions which, in the course of the long trial ahead, might be offen -
Za On the significance of necessarrum, cf. GELZER, 72ff.
23 J . BERANGER, Recherches sur 1'aspect ideologique du principal, Basel 1953, 137ff .
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sive to some of his senatorial colleagues . And, just as with the emperor, his
apparent modesty is praised by the Senate when he finally accepts the con-
tract . In this sense, indeed, the parallel between optimus civis and optimus
princeps is not inappropriate, for in both cases, the image is created of th e
modest and responsible individual serving the best interests of the state . In-
deed, this idea of service is a basic component of the patronage of communi-
ties .
The critical question in this letter is whether Pliny's standing in reference
to the Baetici was simply that of patronus causae, or had he been coopted a s
patronus provinciae 24? Admittedly, the distinction between these two func-
tions is not always clear, but communities clearly employed the patronal rela-
tionship in order to secure such senators for themselves on a permanent basi s
who could most effectively represent their interests at Rome 25 .
In order to understand the nature of the connection between Pliny and the
Baetici in 99, it is necessary to examine the previous relationship between the
two parties. In the year 93, six years earlier, the Senate had instructed Pliny t o
act as counsel for the Baetici in the prosecution of another governor indicte d
for extortion. That is, he was to serve as patronus causae in accordance with
the provisions first established by the lex Acilia 26 . This is what he says about
the case :
Dederat me senatus cum Herennio Senecione advocatum provincia e
Baeticae contra Baebium Massaro, damnatoque Massa censuerat, u t
bona eius publice custodirentur . Senecio, cum explorasset consule s
postulationibus vacaturos, convenit me et 'Qua concordia' inquit 'in-
iunctam nobis accusationem exsecuti sumus, hac adeamus consules pe-
tamusque, ne bona dissipari sinant, quorum esse in custodia debent' .
Respondi: 'Cum simus advocati a senatu dati, dispice num peractas
putes partes nostras senatus cognitione finita .' Et ille: 'Tu quem voles
tibi terminum statues, cui nu/la cum provincia necessitudo nisi e x
beneficio tuo et hoc recenti ; ipse et natus ibi et quaestor in ea fui .' Turn
ego: fixum tibi istud ac deliberatum, sequar to ut, si qua ex hoc
invidia, non tantum tua .' (VII, 33, 4 -5) .
As patronus causae, Pliny clearly considered that his responsibilities to th e
province had come to an end when the case was over ; and Herennius accepted
24 Scholarly opinion is divided on this question . SHERWiN-WHITE, Letters of Pliny, ad loc . ,
and J . DEININGER, Die Provinziallandtage der romischen Kaiserzeit, Munchen 1965, 129-130 ,
consider him as such . HARMAND does not include him in his list of provincial patrons, and leave s
the question of his status open, 414 -417 .
25 ILS 6106 ; Fronto, ad. Am. II, 11, suggests that those men should be elected patro n
» . . . qui mine fori principem locum occupant . c





that interpretation . That Pliny continued to support the provincials thereafte r
was based not on his previous commitment to them, but on his friendship for
his colleague. It is to be noted, moreover, that Herennius felt his own commit-
ment to be continuous because, first, he had been born in the province and ,
second, because he had served there . These two facts establish a natural bond
between the two parties as distinct from the legally defined status of patronus
causae.
In 99, however the situation was very different . The critical passage in th e
letter cited at the beginning of this discussion reads : adlegantes (i . e ., the
Baetici) patrocini foedus (III, 4, 4) . Pliny's language here is unambiguous : in
order to support their request for the advocate's services, the legati provinciae
Baeticae produced a formal treaty (foedus ; cf. VIII, 6, 14, 24, 2 ; X, 93) o f
patrocinium, the validity of which Pliny does not question. Unfortunately, he
does not explain whether, by patrocinium, he means a general patronage, such
as he enjoyed in Tifernum, or the more specific patrocinium of the patronus
causae . In support of the latter interpretation, it may be observed that on th e
occasions when Pliny does use the word patrocinium (VI, 23, 1 ; IX, 7, 1 ; cf.
Cod. Just . II, 7, 9), it refers to his services as an advocate. There are, how -
ever, several problems with this interpretation . First, if the foedus patrocin i
had been made specifically to ensure his services as an advocate, then th e
whole recusatio-cunctatio motif becomes meaningless, for ,he had already
made a formal commitment to represent the interests of the Baetici . This is ,
however, highly unlikely, for he had on at least one previous occasion (I, 7 )
refused to act for them in a similar case and can see grounds for refusing o n
still another (III . 4, 8) . These considerations suggest that Pliny's patrocinium
was the general variety 27. This conclusion is, moreover, supported by hi s
admission that he enjoyed the iura hospitii with these provincials (III, 4, 5) .
This is significant because there are a number of bronze inscriptions from th e
Spanish provinces (tabulae patronatits) which combine the cooptation of a
patron with the extension of hospitium 28 . It is likely that the Baetici are
referring to such a document when they mention foedus patrocini.
There are also problems with this interpretation . Only twelve provincial
patrons are epigraphically attested 29 . Of these only five are senators, four of
whom date to the end of the 3rd Century or still later and the fifth, Noniu s
Balbus, the patronus of the commune Cretensium (CIL X, 1430), probably re-
ceived this honor in about 30 B . C. 30 This suggests that a great deal of caution
is required, if this honor is to be ascribed to Pliny .
27 Cf. NicoLS, Patronum cooptare, patrocinium deferre, ZSSt (forthcoming) .
28 AE 1936, 23 ; 1969/70, 746 and ILS 6108 .
29 HARMAND, 411ff .
30 On Nonius' career, see L. SCHUMACHER, Das Ehrendekret far M . Nonius Balbus au s
Herculaneum, Chiron 6 (1976) 165 -168 .
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The most satisfactory solution to this problem is to find some way of ex-
plaining the patrocinium without making Pliny patronus provinciae . The
starting point must be the iura hospitii, as these are openly acknowledged by
Pliny. It may be that Pliny had been extended such rights in one or more o f
the communities in Baetica or in the province at large after the trial of 93 .
That is, he could have been hospes and not patronus . Indeed, some of the
tablets (tesserae hospitalis) mentioned above do extend hospitium without re-
ferring to patrocinium or to the cooptation of a patron 31 . It is notable, more-
over, that in some of these documents, the hospes receives the community in
fidem clientelamque suam, apparently assuming the functions of both hospes
and patronus32 . It is precisely out of such documents, in which hospitium,
clientela, patrocinium and other related concepts are equated, that misunder-
standings could arise . Hence, it may be that the foedus patrocini referred to
by the Baetici was, in fact, a tessera hospitalis (with or without reference to
clientela) which was understood by the provincials as being equivalent to a ta-
bula patronatus .
There is another possibility . There is no epigraphical evidence for the exist -
ence of hospites provinciae, hence it is unlikely that this was Pliny's status . In-
stead, it is more likely that he enjoyed such iura with one or more communi-
ties of Baetica, and the legati are claiming that, as the tota provincia (III, 9, 4)
stood behind the prosecution of Caecilius, then Pliny's obligations to the indi-
vidual communities could best be fulfilled by defending the whole 33 .
Pliny's contacts with the Baetici may be summarized as follows . In 93, he
served as patronus causae in an action on behalf of the provincials (VII, 33) .
He seems, at first, to have reckoned his relationship as having terminated with
the end of the trial. But soon thereafter, on the urging of Herennius, he was
again active on their behalf. And, for reasons which he does not make clear ,
may have continued to be so over the next several years if the expression ,
made in 97 about his services to the Baetici ( . . . tot officiis, tot laboribus, I ,
7, 2), is to be understood as a reference to events beyond those of 93 . But, re-
gardless of the timing and the situation, a formal agreement of some kind exi-
sted in 99 .
It appears then, that, when a province or a municipality was in need of as-
sistance, the usual procedure was to request the services of a senator who
might be bound to the community by natural or acquired ties . Pliny's col -
league in the prosecution of Baebius Massa in 93, Herennius Senecio, is a
31 ILS 6096, 6104, 6102 .
32 AE 1962, 287 ; 1961, 96 ; 1967, 239 ; and ILS 6097 .
33 That Pliny would be patronus causae for the whole province and then hospes to one o r
more individual communities would not be unusual ; governors of provinces, in so far as the y
became patroni, were patrons of individual communities in the province governed, and not of th e





good example of both . As Herennius told Pliny when the latter was prepare(
to terminate his relations to the province after the completion of the trial :
Tu quem voles tibi terminum statues, cui nulla cum provincia necessitu
do nisi ex beneficio tuo et hoc recenti ; ipse et natus ibi et quaestor in e (
fui (VII, 33, 5 )
That is, it was customary for the community to enlist the support of those s e
nators who were connected to it by natural bonds 34 . By 99, Pliny had, throug l
the iura hospitii and his services and labors on behalf of the province, achiev
ed something like that status .
The relationship between Pliny and the province of Baetica may be sum
marized as follows . First, he had acted formally for the province on at leas
two occasions as patronus causae. Secondly, he enjoyed the iura hospitii will
one or more communities in the province, or perhaps even with the provino
as a whole. Thirdly, he may have been patronus of one or more communities
but it is unlikely that he was ever coopted patronus provinciae . All these fac
tors plus the appeal of the Baetici to his fides and their celebration of him i t
the Senate point to a general, if informal, patronage of the province . Or, i t
other words, the relationship between the two parties consisted of a variety o :
formal and informal ties in which PIiny was clearly the »patron<< and the pr o ,
vincials the oclienteso . This state of affairs is comparable to the traditiona
practice of the institution in the late Republic 35 . Now that Pliny's status ha:
been established, the attitudes governing the exercise of patronage may b (
considered .
The first question to be considered here is : why did the Baetici seek oul
Pliny in 99 instead of a native son like the now dead Herennius? There can bt
no doubt about the fact that there was a sufficient number of senators from
Baetica in the Senate at this time 36. Indeed, the emperor Trajan came from
Italica, a community in that province . The imperial family then surely had an
interest in the selection of any patronus causae . Given these circumstances ,
it is difficult to reconstruct a plausible explanation for the choice of Pliny .
Clearly, the emperor must have allowed or even encouraged the Baetici to see k
out Pliny, which, if true, may well account for his wish to preserve appear-
ances by having the Senate legitimize his status .
34 Note the use of necessitudo, cf . GELZER, 72f .
35 Cf . GELZER, 89f .
36 B . STECH, Senatores Romani qui fuerint inde a Vespasiano usque ad Traiani exitu m
(= Klio Beiheft X), Leipzig 1912, 167-170, and, more recently, R. WIEGELS, Die rtlmischen
Senatoren and Ritter aus den hispanischen Provinzen bis Diokletian, Diss . Freiburg 1971 (unpub-
lished) . There are at least ten from Baetica .
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The reasons which Pliny openly and officially professed for undertakin g
the prosecution of Caecilius are, however, more traditional and idealistic . As
such, they suggest much about the conflicting attitudes toward patronage o f
communities during the principate . He says :
Compulit autem me ad hoc consilium non solum consensus senatus,
quamquam hic maxime, verum et alii quidam minores, sed tamen nume-
ri . Veniebat in mentem priores nostros etiam singulorum hospitum in-
iurias voluntariis accusationibus exsecutos, quo deformius arbitraba r
publics hospitii Tura neglegere . Praeterea cum recordarer, quanta pro is-
dem Baeticis superiore advocatione etiam pericula subissem, conservan-
dum veteris officii meritum novo videbatur (III, 4, 5 - 6) .
Hence, the major reason for accepting was the unanimous feeling in the Sen-
ate (consensus senatus) ; that is, the good citizen yields gracefully to the autho -
rity of the Senate (why the Senate should urge this task on him is not clear ; but
it is likely that the consensus was not as spontaneous as Pliny suggests, but ,
rather, conformed to what the emperor, the provincials and Pliny all wished) .
These two themes, the weight of tradition and the responsibility of th e
good citizen are then given further emphasis : Veniebat in mentem priores
nostros etiam singulorum hospitum iniurias voluntariis accusationibus exsecu-
tos (III, 4, 5) . This idea is consistent with the idea of patronage developed in
the early principate . Dionysius of Halicarnasus notes :
O a `PwpOAog gnixArjaer re eOrrpenei rd irpaypa txddprlc e
irarpwvetav ovopdaas -rv ruiv rrcvrjrcov xai rarreivc3v irpoaracfav,
xal ra Epya xpr'c ra npocr Orlxev xa-repois, xai rpt2,avOpaiirous xai 7to -
.1irixag dnepyaCopevoc avrcov rds Qv(uyfac (II, 9, 3)
Thus, the good patron (or, as the case may be, the good client) is also a goo d
citizen. Tradition then sanctified this exercise of civic virtue .
Pliny then continues his explanation with a statement that is central to th e
understanding of Roman patronage :
Est enim ita comparatum ut antiquiora beneficia subvertas, nisi ili a
posterioribus cumules . Nam quamlibet saepe obligati, si quid unum ne-
ges, hoc solum meminerunt quod negatum est (III, 4, 6) .
Pliny does not specify here whether the beneficia result from the actions of a
formally designated patronus or from those of a benefactor, but the attitude
described applies equally to both . The duties of each party are clear . The be-
neficiaries (or clientes) are expected to remember and »memorialize« the be-




forgets past achievements and »memorializes« instead the rejection . Thus, as
argued above, the services of the patron and benefactor are exchanged agains t
the celebration of his name and generosity . The Baetici praised Pliny's past
services to them in the Senate, thereby honoring him. It would be a terrible
blow to his reputation andfides to refuse their request . He seems to be sayin g
here that the patronal relationship depended, at least in theory, upon the con-
tinuous performance of mutual duties and services . To deny even one reques t
could result in a serious loss of clientela and prestige .
Pliny admits that two other considerations also moved him to undertak e
the prosecution :
Ducebar etiam quod decesserat Classicus, amotumque erat quad in eius-
modi causis solet esse tristissimum, periculum senatoris . Videbam erg o
advocationi meae non minorem gratiam quam si viveret ille propositam ,
invidiam nullam. In summa computabam, si munere hoc lam tertio fun-
gerer, faciliorem mihi excusationem fore, si quis incidisset, quem no n
deberem accusare . Nam cum est omnium officiorum finis aliquis, tur n
optime libertati venia obsequio praeparatur (III, 4, 7 - 8) .
This statement illustrates the contradiction involved in the exercise of patron -
age . Whenever one acts on behalf of one's clients, particularly when it i s
against another senator, one risks incurring the invidia of one's colleagues (cf .
Caes . Bell. Hisp . 42, 2). This invidia is the consequence of the tendency of a
privileged class to view an attack on one of its members as an attack on all . As
Pliny writes, the most painful aspect of the situation would have been theperi-
culum senatoris . To ally with the provincials and to prosecute a fellow senato r
meant that the patronus (causae) would not only earn the enmity of the defen-
dant, but also antagonize many of the defendant's friends 37 . Consequently, t o
prosecute Classicus would create an uncomfortable situation in the Senate ,
would incur the displeasure of many of Classicus' friends, and, in particular ,
would enrage those who were friends of both Pliny and Classicus . The third
situation, the conflict of coinciding obligations, is not an uncommon one ;
Pliny devotes a number of letters to resolving such painful choices 38 . Thus, a
Roman senator, especially a senior one who was sensitive about his good repu -
tation, would proceed with great care in such situations so that, in upholding
his patronal responsibilities, he would not unnecessarily jeopardize other con-
nections 3 9
37 Cf . ep. VII, 33, 7 : non advocati fidem sed inimici amaritudinem implesse .
38 E . g ., epp . I, 7 and IV, 17 .
39 The situation might be quite different for an ambitious junior senator hoping to make a
name for himself. A good example is Aquillius Regulus (PIR 2 A 1005) ; see also R. SYME, Tacitus ,
Oxford I958, 100 -101 .
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Finally, there is the idea of patronage as a burden . Nam cum est omnium
officiorum finis aliquis (III, 4, 8), Pliny writes . When he has accepted a
certain number of such requests, he may, without losing his standing, fre e
himself from further burdens, especially if the new requests conflict wit h
other responsibilities . This idea would appear to contradict the statemen t
made above ; namely, that the patronal relationship had to be exercised con-
tinuously in order to be maintained 40 . The contradiction is a real one, and i s
essentially between patronage in theory and patronage in practice . Theo-
retically and ideally, a patron is obliged to defend and protect his client under
all circumstances ; in fact, however, as Pliny recognizes, situations will aris e
when his responsibilities to Baetica will conflict with his duties to other friend s
and clients 41 .
There is, furthermore, an element of impatience to be found in this letter .
Pliny is being called upon to instigate a major trial on behalf of his litigiou s
clients for the third time in six years 42. Not only that, but he can also easily
envisage a fourth case in the near future (III, 4, 3) . Their demands have
become a burden to him .
This conclusion raises the question of what return Pliny received for his in -
vestment of time, talent and energy . Two answers are offered in the lette r
under discussion . First, he says that, in acting for the provincials, he will earn
their gratia . It is not easy to determine how this gratia would have been ex-
pressed, but there is no evidence that it brought Pliny any material profit 4 3
Nor does it appear likely that patrons were able to gain any direct political ad -
vantage from the client-community as they had in the late Republic . Second ,
and most significant, is the fact that Pliny stresses that he has won the consen-
sus of the Senate, the universal approval of his colleagues . The real profit fo r
the patron of a community was, then, the enhancement of his prestige an d
reputation. Patronage was, indeed, an honor, but one which required sacri-
fices .
This discussion of III, 4, has suggested a number of conclusions about th e
nature of patronage of communities in the principate . First, the patronal rela-
tionship consisted of a variety of formal and informal ties . Secondly, the for-
malization of the relationship depended upon a number of factors, of whic h
the status and origin of the prospective patron appear to be the most im-
portant . Thirdly, Roman tradition and the imperial ideology assigned the pa-
tronage of communities to the duties of the good citizen toward his state an d
society . Hence, prestige was acquired by fulfilling all obligations successfully .
Fourthly, in reality, Pliny admits, patronage was a necessary burden ; it
4° See above 375 f .
41 Cf. ep . VI, 18, discussed below, 378 f .
42 Cf. epp . I, 7 ; VII, 33 and III, 4 .




brought the patron little material or political advantage in comparison to hi s
expenditure of time, talent and energy .
To this point, we have seen Pliny functioning in a formal relationship (a s
patronus Tiferni Tiberini) and in a relationship with the Baetici which ha d
formal and informal aspects . But, whether formal or informal, both connec-
tions appear to belong to a general patronage of communities . One of the
formal aspects of Pliny's relationship to the Baetici, and an aspect which with
time and services eventually led to the general, if informal patronage, was th e
office of patronus causae. Pliny also served as the patron us causae of another
community, Firmum, about which he writes in a letter to (Statius) Sabinus :
Ragas ut agam Firmanorum publicam causam ; quod ego quamquam
plurimis occupationibus distentus adnitar . Cupio enim et ornatissimam
coloniam advocationis officio, et to gratissimo tibi munere obstringere .
Nam cum familiaritatem nostram, ut soles praedicare, ad praesidiu m
ornamentumque tibi sumpseris, nihil est quod negare debeam, praeser-
tim pro patria petenti . Quid enim precibus aut honestius piis aut effica-
cius amantis? Proinde Firmanis tuffs ac lam potius nostris obliga fide m
meam ; quos labore et studio meo dignos cum splendor ipsorum turn ho c
rnaxime pollicetur, quod credibile est optimos else inter quos to tabs
exstiteris (VI, 18) .
In this letter, we find two different relationships to the community of Fir -
mum . Sabinus was born in Firmum ; this may be deduced from Pliny's notic e
that Sabinus is interceding with him on behalf of his patria . SHERWIN-WHITE
has suggested that Sabinus > may well be patronus, like Pliny at Tifernum« 44 .
As will be demonstrated below 45, it was very unusual for a senator to be co-
opted as the formal patronus of his patria at this time ; hence, without defini-
tive evidence to the contrary, it is unlikely that Sabinus was ever designated
patronus there. Nor was there any need to do so, for his obligation to (or
patronage of) Firmum was natural, being determined by birth . It was, in fact ,
parallel to the situation of Herennius Senecio toward Baetica and required n o
formalization.
Pliny's status is more ambiguous . First, he has agreed to act for the com-
munity as patronus causae (ut agam Firmamorum publicam causam) . His re-
lationship to them is then comparable to the one which he enjoyed in his earl y
dealings with the Baetici ; namely, the conclusion of the Iegal issue would als o
terminate the formal relationship46. He does suggest, however, that he migh t
44 SHERWIN-WHITE, Letters of Pliny, 375 .
45 Cf. 379ff .
46 See above, 370ff.
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have had a somewhat more enduring relationship in mind, for he writes :
Proinde Firmanis tuis ac iam potius nostris obliga fidem meam, suggesting
thereby, that his relationship to the Armani is comparable to Sabinus' . Never-
theless, should Pliny's position in respect to the Firmani develop from that o f
patronus causae to that of patronus municipii, it would, in contrast to
Sabinus' situation, probably be formalized in some manner .
Pliny's attitudes toward his potential clients and toward the bond itself ar e
revealing . By his own admission, he is fully occupied with other duties, thi s
will be an additional burden . He is, however, willing to accept, he writes ,
because a friend has petitioned him to do so and the duties of friendship are
binding. Here again, Pliny notes the burdensome nature of the service . He has
accepted because the Firmani have merited his services and Sabinus' request is
an honorable one . He will, thereby, enhance his reputation by accepting .
Good citizenship is stressed then on all sides .
Pliny's benefactions to his home town of Comum are well attested, both i n
his own letters and in the inscriptions which have been found there 47 . Though
both varieties of evidence provide considerable detail about his career in the
imperial government and his numerous benefactions to the municipality, it i s
nowhere stated in these documents that he was, in fact, a patronus of the com -
munity 48. As a consequence, there is good reason to believe that Pliny neve r
enjoyed a formal patronage of Comum . Indeed, there is no substantial evi-
dence for the hypothesis that it was at all customary for senators (note th e
limitation) to become patroni of the patriae.
Let us first, however, consider Pliny's benefactions to Comum . As these
are well known and frequently discussed a simple enumeration should suf-
fice49 . He spent HS 1100000 for the construction and maintenance of a
library. He built public baths for the town the cost of which is unknown ,
though he does add that he contributed an additional HS 300 000 for their de-
coration plus capital of HS 200 000, the interest on which should be used fo r
maintenance . He set up an alimenta program for the support of boys and girl s
of poor families in Comum, and an additional HS 1860000 for the upkeep o f
those slaves freed by his testament . He also provided capital sufficient ,
through interest earned on it, to pay one third of the salary of a teacher o f
grammar and literature . There were other smaller donations which need not
be mentioned here . The magnitude of the benefactions does not, of course ,
prove that Pliny was the patronus of Comum, but it certainly suggests a ver y
strong relationship between the two parties .
47 Epp . I, 3 ; 8 ; II, 8 ; HI, 6 ; IV, 13 ; V, 7 ; 10; VII, 11 ; 18 and CIL V, 5262-5263 ; 5667 ; and
AE 1972, 212 .
48 The critical inscription is CIL V, 5262 . It appears to have been set up in Comum after hi s
death and contains no reference to this office .




Further support for the hypothesis that Pliny was the unofficial patron of
Comum may be deduced from his attitude toward the town . In one letter espe .
cially, he uses an expression which conforms exactly to Cicero's vocabulary o f
patronage as analysed by GELZER 50 . In making his gift to Comum of a salar y
for a teacher, he comments : nihil gratius (praestare) patriae potestis (IV
13 . 9) .
Hence, both the fact that he confers benefactions on Comum similar t c
those conferred on Tifernurn, where he was officially patronus and the use o f
the vocabulary of patronage to describe his generosity indicate that the rela ,
tionship was essentially patronal, even if he was not a formal patronus of th e
town.
This conclusion raises the problem of the distinction between patronag e
and benefaction. During the principate and in the context of the patronage of
communities, the difference was one of form rather of substance . GELZEF
and BADIAN have demonstrated how relationships based on fides (and bott
patronage and benefaction are included) developed ; namely that uncle )
Roman notions of gratitude there was >> . . . a tendency for a benefit conferrec
to establish a permanent obligation« 51 . This obligation was expressed in th e
continuing performance of beneficia (by the patron) and officia (by th(
client) . Caesar was apparently the first to distinguish between benefactors i t
general and a subgroup of benefactors who bore the formal title of patro
nus 52 , but both relationships continued to be based on fides (and not on ius
and benefactors and patroni continued to perform the same services .
If it is accepted that these beneficia conferred on the community (and of
members of the community, cf. I, 19) indicate that Pliny did act as at
unofficial patron of Comum, we must still account for the fact that h i
position (as well as that of Herennius Senecio in Baetica and Statius Sabinu ;
in Firmum) was never formalized . Certainly, his services to Comum woul c
have merited such an honor . An explanation for this phenomenon, as far a
one can be given, must consider both the origin and status of the patronus am
the development of patronage as an institution .
Inscriptions testify to the existence of 123 patroni of communities betwee t
the principates of Augustus and Trajan 53 . Of these, 73 were senators, 27 wen
members of the equestrian order and 23 belonged to the municipal aristocrac y
- a rough proportion of 3 : 1 :1 . In other words, 6007o of the known patron
were senators . When the origin of these patrons is considered, some inte r
50 GELZER, 80- 81 .
5I BADIAN, 8-9; GELZER, 69ff . ; P. VEYNE, Le pain et le cirgue, Paris 1976, 74ff .
52 See the Lex Ursonensis (ILS 6087) cc . 97 and 130 discussed by NICOLE, Gemeindepatronat
53 The data can, with an effort, be derived from HARMAND . See also F. ENGESSER, Der Stadt
patronat in Italien and den Westprovinzen des rtimischen Reiches bis Diokletian, Diss . Freibur g
1957 (unpublished) 224 - 226 .
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esting results emerge . Of the 73 senators who were patroni, only 9 were pa-
trons of their patriae . On the other hand, 21 of 27 knights and 11 of 23 muni-
cipal aristocrats did receive this honor from their hometowns . Of the 9 sena-
tors who were patroni patriae, 5 of them lived during the Augustan Ag e 54 , two
of them were provincials 55 , one of the nine is a questionable identification 56
and the last one was a member of the equestrian order who was adlected into
the Senate at an advanced stage in his career 57 . Generally speaking then, sena-
tors did not tend to become patrons of their patriae in the period between th e
principates of Augustus and Trajan. From this point of view, the formal pa-
tronage of patriae was most common for members of the equestrian order .
There is some confirmation for this conclusion . Pliny's grandfather-in-
law, Calpurnius Fabatus (PIR 2 C 263), also came from Comum, was a mem-
ber of the equestrian order and, as might be predicted on the basis of the
above analysis, he was, as an inscription testifies, an official patron of Co -
mum (ILS 2721) .
In order to account for this phenomenon, the development of patronage a s
a formal institution (i . e ., patronus by virtue of a decretum decurionum) must
be examined . BADIAN has described the various means by which clientela
could be established, of these, only two are relevant to this discussion 58 . Ini-
tially, both deditio and applicatio could be, executed by formal oral agree-
ments and, in the case of applicatio, perhaps too by the exchange of tesserae
(e . g ., ILS 6093) . The idea of bestowing such honors as that of patrocinium by
a resolution of >>senate and people(( may have been derived from Hellenisti c
models but had become common enough in Caesar's day to merit regula-
tion 59 . The evidence is by no means certain (only 14 inscriptions mention pa-
troni60 ), but it appears to be the case that the pattern mentioned above (name-
ly, that knights were usually, and senators rarely, patroni of their patriae) was
already established in the late republic .
It is unclear why communities chose to honor fellow-citizens in a manner
which they had previously used to attach powerful outsiders to themselves .
That they did so suggests that there was a different basis for the institution i n
respect to senators and to equestrians. As senators had traditionally received
such honors from outside communities in connection with their administrativ e
54 PER2 A 1178, A 65; PIR 1 P 802, T 104, V 187 .
55 P1R2 A 182, J 279 . The former belongs to the reign of Gaius and the latter to that o f
Claudius .
56 H.-G . PFLAUM, Les procuratoriennes @questres sous le haut-empire romain, Paris 1950 ,
175, 2 .
57 PIR 1 181 . He was an equestrian officer with Vespasian in 69 .
58 BADIAN, 2 ff .
59 Cf . n . 52 .
60 For the 14, cf. ILLRP 1I, 475 . The proportion of senators to non-senators is routhly th e




activities and as the mutual obligation, or pietas (cf . IV, 13, 5), between the
two was self-evident, it may have been felt that the additional honor of patro-
nus patriae would add little to their prestige and might even have been conci-
dered an insult . For wealthy men of only local importance, the situation wa s
different . In the first century most of them probably had little opportunity fo r
gaining prestige beyond holding municipal offices . It may be that the commu-
nities felt that an especially generous benefaction had to be acknowledge d
with a special honor 61 ; hence, they coopted them as patron/ just as if they were
powerful outsiders . In this case, however, the basis of the honor was rathe r
actin gratiarum (cf. Pan. 4, 2), than pietas . But, regardless of how one ex-
plains it, it is evident that considerations of status and origin were relevant to
the conferral of patronage already in the late republic .
This conclusion does not mean that attitudes toward this kind of patron -
age remained stable thereafter . In the second century, two changes took place .
First, senators are now found as patroni patriae . Of the 294 patrons known,
148 were patrons of their patriae and of the 148, 31 were senators (20 Italians ,
11 provincials) . Second, it was really among the equestrians and municipa l
aristocrats that patronatus became frequent for though the absolute numbe r
of senatorial patrons increased, the relative share slipped from 6 007o to 4007o 62
These figures suggest that the traditional basis of patronage had changed . The
connection with a powerful outsider was, with the extension of citizenship an d
the increasing number of provincial senators, less important that the actio
gratiarum . This marks an important stage in the evolution of patronage, fo r
as time went on, the honor was increasingly used not only to express thanks ,
but also to formalize the relationship between the community and its most im-
portant member(s) .
Throughout this discussion, attention has been given to the question of
what services (beyond that of advocacy) the patron performed for his clients .
Indeed, the impression one receives from the sources, both literary and epi-
graphical, is that patronage involved the exchange of the patron's talents an d
wealth for enhanced prestige . Certainly, the accumulation of prestige was o f
great importance to the Roman aristocrat and perhaps even more so to a
homo novus like Pliny. Nevertheless, the doubt remains about whether ther e
might not be other advantages for the patron, advantages which Pliny, for
one reason or another, leaves unmentioned . This is unlikely . First, Pliny is no t
at all reluctant to acknowledge the reciprocal nature of the relationship :
reddam vicem si reposces, reddam et si non reposces (II, 9, 6) is a frequentl y
repeated idea in the letters concerning patronage (cf. II, 13, 1). Nor, and
61 Such benefactions are mentioned on the earliest inscriptions referring to patrons of non -
senatorial status, cf . ILLRP 523, 617 .
62 These figures, like those mentioned in n . 53, can, with an effort be derived from HARMAND .
See also, ENGESSER, Stadtpatronat, 226ff.
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somewhat surprizingly, does Pliny suppress the monetary advantage of pa-
tronage . In a letter concerning rebates for wine merchants, Pliny notes that h e
expected his beneficium to encourage the merchants : et in futurum omnes
cum ad emendum turn etiam ad solvendum allici videbantur (VIII, 2, 7) .
There is then no hesitation to mention potential return for services rendered .
Admittedly, he might have withheld information about illegal or immora l
profit, but his abhorrence of such payments, mentioned in V, 13, seem s
genuine . Consequently, if such advantage is not mentioned it is reasonable t o
believe that Pliny did not receive it . Again, the motivating factor for the
patron was primarily prestige 63
This was certainly not the case in the late republican period when client -
communities helped to provide the material and human resources for the po-
litical struggles of the Roman nobility . Citizen-communities (note the limita-
tion) could be expected to vote for their patrons in elections, to provide sol-
diers for their campaigns, and even if they did not render active support, the y
were not usually compelled to act against the interests of their patrons 64. The
cases of Pompey and Picentum and of Antonius and Bononia are well-know n
examples of this phenomenon .
In Augustus' >>restored republic <, the exercise of patronage was regulate d
>>in the public interest« . Although Augustus was concerned to render such po -
litically dangerous relationships harmless, he did not want to destroy an old
manifestly useful tradtition. By acquiring control over elections, monopoliz-
ing the military, and putting an end to open political contention, the emperor s
gradually but effectively deprived the patron of the traditional return on hi s
investments 65 . There is, however, another side . The emperors encouraged a
new ideology in which patronage and benefaction, both of which created obli-
gation between two parties, now were defined in terms of civic virtue . Genero -
sity toward a community (amor liberalitatis, I, 8, 9 ; cf. VI, 34) and equitable
administration of provinces (VIII, 24 ; X, 3 a), the two benefactions whic h
most commonly led to a formal or informal patronage, became the leadin g
qualities of a senator and optimus civis . To make this concept work, however ,
required that the emperor himself recognize and support it . In fact, the same
ideology was applied to his own position . In his Panegyricus to Trajan, Pliny
remarks on several occasions that the optimus princeps (note the parallel to
optimus civis) is one who accepts his position reluctantly, knowing full wel l
the toils, troubles, difficulties and pains which await him, but having only on e
desire ; namely to serve the state (Pan. 2, 4, 7, 21, 79)66 .
63 See ep. VI, 33, for another example .
64 Cf . GELZER, 96ff.
65 On this point, see PREMERSTEIN, Werden and Wesen, 112 - 116 .




Though the emperor now controlled the tradtional sources of patronal
power, and encouraged a new ideology stressing service instead of materia l
and political profit, he did, apparently, find it necessary to support the ideo-
logy with more concrete incentives . In his Panegyricus, Pliny comments :
Prodest bonos esse, cum sit satis abundeque, se non nocet ; his honores his
sacerdotia, his provincias offers, hi amicitia tua hi iudicio florent (44. 7) . In
other words, the optimus civis, as demonstrated by his benefactions, derive s
material and/or political advantage not from the direct support of his clients ,
but from the emperor himself . As long as the latter was willing to support, en-
courage and reward the patronage of communities and other benefactions the
values, as described by Pliny, would persist .
This conclusion should not be interpreted to show that, by exercising a
formal or informal patronage of communities, an ambitious senator could
expect to receive the consulate in due course . For, though the emperor might
encourage senators to perform this service, there was no commitment on hi s
part . Nor was it necessary for him to make such a commitment as communi-
ties would naturally seek out those senators who were known to have in-
fluence with him (cf . ILS 6106) . Rather, patronage of communities belongs,
as does oratorical ability, to the useful and the decorative . Both, though po-
tentially dangerous to the old as well as the new government, were turned t o
the service and ornamentation of the state . They provide, indeed, the publi c
justification for wealth and honors received at the emperors' hands, bu t
would be useless to anyone who did not have the appropriate loyalties an d
connections .
Conclusions
Traditionally, the cooptation of a patronus had been used to bind a power-
ful outsider to the community and was frequently connected with beneficia
arising from a senator's administrative activities . In the principate, however ,
patronus had, by extension, become a title or dignity which communities con -
ferred as an actio gratiarum . In this extended sense, it was also appropriate fo r
native benefactors of non-senatorial status . Technically speaking, patronatus
refers strictly to the status of an individual who has been offically coopte d
patronus by a community (cf . Pliny at Tifernum) . And because the conferra l
of the title was closely connected to the ideas of benefaction, gratitude and
obligation, the community could use the honor to encourage or reward bene-
factors just as the benefactor could expect his prestige and dignitas to be en-
hanced by the community .
There was, however, no simple connection between beneficia conferred
and the bestowal of the title . Whether a community extended patronatus to a
benefactor depended upon a number of factors . First the beneficia had to be
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appropriate to the title . Second, as has been demonstrated, the status of the
benefactor and his previous connection to the community determined the
degree of formality ; in the early principate, senators generally became th e
official patrons of communities to which they had no natural ties and did no t
accept the title in their patriae. The reverse was the case for equites . But ,
whether the beneficium was conferred by a patronus or by a benefactor, a
sense of obligation between the two parties was developed . Third, Pliny's rela -
tions with Baetica, Firmum and Comum indicate that the patronage of com-
munities consisted of a variety of formal and informal ties which had to b e
exercised continuously . The conclusion cannot be deduced from the epigra-
phical evidence alone .
Furthermore, it has been shown that the attitudes toward this form of
patronage were contradictory . This was primarily due to the irreconcilability
of theory and practice . Theoretically, of the services of the patron to his com-
munity were part of his duties as a good citizen . His reward was the prestige
and reputation gained by exercising civic virtue . In practice, Pliny considered
the burden of the benefactions, in both a material and political sense, could ,
in certain situations, be greater than the reward to be gained . This resulted
from the fact that Augustus and his successors had deprived the patron, as
they had the orator, of the traditional return on his services in order to brin g
the potentially dangerous relationship under their control . To perpetuate the
useful and traditional aspects of the institution (namely, public benefactions) ,
the emperor himself had to provide his loyal supporters with suitable compen -
sation for undertaking this burden .
Some general conclusions might be drawn from this analysis . First, the
attitudes described here explain in part the intellectual and moral backgroun d
to the enormous (and virtually unparalleled) outpouring of private capital for
public welfare in the second century . As Pliny says : oportet privatis utilitati-
bus publicas, mortalibus aeternas anteferre (VII, 18, 5) . Secondly, it is salu-
tary to describe how divers and mutable the patronal relationship was an d
how the exercise of patronage was defined and limited by a number o f
variables including status and origin . And, finally, the patronage of commu-
nities was, like oratorical success, one of those services which was both the
public justification of wealth and honors as well as the proof of influence .
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